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 Informal Firms in Developing Countries:
Entrepreneurial Stepping Stone or
Consolation Prize?
1 Introduction
In developing economies perhaps 40% of GDP is contributed by producers without
formal status (Schneider and Este, 2000; Schneider, 2006) and in many countries
this percentage is growing (World Bank, 2007). To try and explain the reasons for
and consequences of informality an extensive literature has accumulated. Many
of the theoretical contributions to this literature are concerned with the eﬀects of
the net costs and beneﬁts of informality relative to formality. They are formulated
in a multi-ﬁrm context, focusing on issues such as competition between ﬁrms,
the structure of an industry or on the evolution of an economy. The question of
what status will be chosen by a single ﬁrm, in partial equilibrium, is a simple and
relatively minor part of each model.
However, once uncertainty is introduced, the factors underlying the choice be-
tween formality and informality are more complicated, and interesting issues arise
bearing on the role of informality. In this paper we analyze a two-period model in
which, at the beginning of the ﬁrst period, an entrepreneur chooses whether his
or her (price-taking) ﬁrm will enter an industry formally or informally, or whether
1to stay out. This choice is made under uncertainty about proﬁtability; but if en-
try is chosen, either formal or informal, the experience of producing in the ﬁrst
period reveals the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability. Then, given that entry has occurred, at the
beginning of the second period the entrepreneur faces the choice, under certainty,
between continuing with the same or switching formality/informality status, or
exit. In each period formality and informality have various cost/beneﬁtd i ﬀer-
ences, including with respect to sunk cost. In this framework, we consider two
speciﬁc questions relating to whether the availability of the option of informal
status for a ﬁrm may play a dynamic role in its entry and continued production.
These ‘stepping stone’ and ‘consolation prize’ arguments are suggested in Bennett
and Estrin (2009). In the present paper we formulate them in detail to assess their
validity.
The literature generally views informality as something that may have to be
lived with for a while, but which it would be better to eliminate. For example,
Loayza (1996) argues that informality undermines the tax base, with negative
eﬀects on investment public infrastructure. De Paula and Scheinkman (2008) note
that there is growing evidence that informal ﬁrms are less eﬃcient than formal
ones, suggesting that this might be because of their ‘necessarily’ small size and
lack of access to credit and legal protection. Furthermore, informal employment is
disadvantageous to workers in that it generally comes without social beneﬁts (see,
2e.g., World Bank, 2007). These perspectives are built into our model.
An alternative view, associated particularly with Maloney (2004) sees a sig-
niﬁcant proportion of informal ﬁrms, especially the self-employed, in Mexico and
some other Latin American countries, as the equivalent of small-scale entrepre-
neurial ﬁrms in developed economies. For these ﬁrms, informality is a rational
response to the excessive regulation of formality. The analysis in the present pa-
per gives a complementary perspective - informality may have dynamic beneﬁts
in an uncertain world because it involves smaller outlays, including on sunk costs,
than formal operation does.1
We assume that a formal ﬁrm has a higher unit labour cost than an informal
ﬁrm, the diﬀerence being interpreted either as the requirement that a formal ﬁrm
must provide social beneﬁts, or that it must pay a statutory minimum wage (a
similar assumption is made by Rauch, 1991, Loayza, 1996, and Banerji and Jain,
2007, among others). However, a formal ﬁrm obtains a productivity beneﬁtf r o m
access to public services (e.g., legal protection and contract enforcement) that may
not be available to an informal ﬁrm (Straub, 2005; Amaral and Quintin, 2006; de
Paula and Scheinkman, 2008).2 In practice, informality is strongly associated
1Similar arguments can be made with respect to choosing between small and large size even
without the formality-informality dimension being included in the model. However, the analysis
of these arguments in the context of formality and informality is particularly important because
it relates to whether government policy should actively discourage informality.
2This advantage may also be interpeted as reﬂecting the ability of a formal, but not an
informal, ﬁrm to sell its output to the government, thereby receiving a higher price than for a
private sale.
3with small size, the expansion of informal ﬁrms often being inhibited by the fear
of attracting the attention of the authorities (Fortin, Marceau and Savard,1997;
World Bank, 2007), while some regulations only apply to ﬁrms above a speciﬁed
size (see, e.g., Ahsan and Pages, 2007, on beneﬁts for workers in India). To give a
stylized representation of this size factor we assume that if the ﬁrm were operated
formally it would use twice as much capital and labour as it would if it were
informal.3
The stepping-stone argument relates to whether entering informally, to test the
water before uncertainty is resolved, may be a rational choice for the entrepreneur.
We suggest alternative interpretations of the stepping stone in this context. In
particular, we consider whether, for some parameter values, having the option of
entering informally in the ﬁrst period will, given the potential to switch to formality
in the second period, be the decisive factor in inducing the entrepreneur to enter
at all.4
The consolation-prize argument concerns the possible impact of being able
3A similar formulation is used by Bennett (2008) to analyze welfare aspects of formal-
ity/informality and by Bennett and Estrin (2009) to analyze interactions between formal and
informal ﬁrms. Other cost/beneﬁts for formal, but not informal, ﬁrms that appear in the liter-
ature, but which we do not consider, are taxes (Auriol and Warlters, 2005), registration costs
(Antunes and Cavalcanti, 2007), and access to formal ﬁnance (Straub, 2005) and superior tech-
nology (Chong and Gradstein, 2007). Also, endogenous growth models have been developed, in
which higher taxes ﬁnance more productive public infrastructure but give an incentive to ﬁrms
to be informal so as not to pay tax (see, for example, Loayza, 1996, Sarte, 2000, and Ihrig and
Moe, 2004).
4It is noted by the World Bank (2007, p 140) that in Mexico new entrants into self employment
are more likely to start their businesses without any employees, testing the waters before they
make any signiﬁcant investment decisions. Self-employment in developing economies is commonly
treated as part of the informal sector.
4to choose informality in the second period, having entered formally in the ﬁrst
period.5 Suppose that formal entry in the ﬁrst period only yields a positive present
value of the proﬁt stream because of the existence of the option of being able
to switch to informality in the second period; that is, without this option, the
entrepreneur would not enter in the ﬁrst period. In this case informality oﬀers a
consolation prize that plays a critical role in attracting entry.
After analyzing these arguments, we arrive at the general conclusion that ranges
of parameter values exist for which the stepping-stone and consolation-prize argu-
ments hold. Indeed, the stepping-stone argument obtains for a wide range of para-
meter values that appear realistic. However, in our stylized model the consolation-
prize argument only applies for a range of parameter values that is so narrow that it
appears of little practical signiﬁcance. Therefore the stepping-stone argument, but
not the consolation-prize one, suggests a potential dynamic rationale for adopting
lenient government policy towards informality.
Section 2 outlines the model. Sections 3 and 4 examine the stepping-stone and
consolation-prize arguments, respectively. Section 5 contains further discussion of
our assumptions, and Section 6 a concludes. An appendix provides some technical
details.
5This might occur by transferring the assets for the (formal) ﬁrm to set up another (informal)
ﬁrm under another name.
52T h e M o d e l
At time t =0a risk-neutral entrepreneur considers whether to enter a given
industry in a developing economy. The proﬁtability of his or her ﬁrm in the
industry is unknown at this time; but if entry is chosen, production occurs at
time t =1 , resolving the uncertainty, i.e., it reveals what proﬁtability is. If
the entrepreneur then decides to continue, production at t =2will take place
under certainty. This formulation of uncertainty can be regarded as reﬂecting
o n eo rb o t ho ft w of o r m so fu n c e r t a i n t y .T h eﬁrst is ﬁrm-speciﬁc (or equivalently
entrepreneur-speciﬁc), as modelled by Jovanovic (1982), with the ﬁrm learning its
own idiosyncratic proﬁtability through experience. The second is industry-speciﬁc,
as formulated by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) and Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik
(2007), which relates to an industry that is new to a developing economy. The
industry is assumed already to exist in other economies, but it is unknown ex ante
what its proﬁtability will be when adapted to the speciﬁc institutional deﬁciencies
and factor supply constraints of the developing economy concerned. In this case,
production by an initial entrant reveals proﬁtability for all future entrants.
At t =1the entrepreneur may choose informal status or formal status for
the ﬁrm.6 At t =2 ,i ft h eﬁrm continues in production its formality/informality
status from t =1may be maintained, or its status may be switched. At either
6Although it would be interesting to allow for the possibility that the ﬁrm may employ some
workers formally and some informally, the model is not suited to examining this issue.
6time, if the ﬁrm is informal it employs one unit of labour, while if it is formal it
employs two. Factor proportions are assumed ﬁxed, an informal ﬁrm using k units
of capital, and a formal ﬁrm 2k. Thus, to operate informally at t =1a ﬁrm must
purchase k units of capital, and if it switches to formality at t =2it must purchase
an additional k units. To operate formally at t =1it must purchase 2k units of
capital, and if it switches to informality at t =2it is assumed to dispose freely of
its excess capital. We assume that the ﬁrm is a price taker in all markets.7
If the ﬁrm is informal it pays the market wage rate w, whereas if it is formal
it pays w + s ≡ ¯ w, with either s being interpreted as the cost of providing social
beneﬁts or ¯ w being interpreted as the statutory minimum wage. We assume that,
per unit of labour (and the associated k units of capital), if the ﬁrm is formal it
produces β times as much as it would if it were informal. Proﬁtability depends on
the value taken by a stochastic variable whose realization θ is deﬁned to be the
revenue from operating informally, and is assumed uniform over [0,2Θ].8
7By specifying a larger size for a formal ﬁrm than an informal ﬁrm we are implicitly assuming
that the risk of discovery and associated penalties are are so great if the ﬁrm is informal and
large, that the entrepreneur never pursues this option. Reformulation of the model explicitly to
incorporate this factor would make it more complicated without aﬀecting the basic insights that
are obtained.
8θ may be understood as output with either the Jovanovic ﬁrm-speciﬁc interpretation or the
Hausmann-Rodrick industry-speciﬁc interpretation of uncertainty; but with the latter interpre-
tation θ may alternatively be understood either as unit price.
7Thus, at t =1proﬁts from informality and from formality are, respectively,9
π1i = θ − w − k;( 1 )
π1f =2 ( βθ− ¯ w − k).( 2 )
If the ﬁrm entered informally (formally) at t =1 ,i tb e g i n st =2with k (2k)u n i t s
of capital. Assuming free disposal, if it is informal for t =2its proﬁti st h e n
π2i = θ − w,( 3 )
w h i l ei fi ti sf o r m a la tt =2its proﬁti s
π2f =2 ( βθ− ¯ w) − k if informal at t =1 ;( 4 )
=2 ( βθ− ¯ w) if formal at t =1 .( 5 )
The entrepreneur’s choice problem is solved by backward induction. We start
by examining the choice made at t =2 , ﬁrst assuming that formal entry occurred
at t =1 , and then instead assuming informal entry at t =1 . In each of these cases
9We could interpret the informal ﬁrm as involving self-employment, with w being the oppor-
tunity cost for the entrepreneur - that is, the market wage that he or she could earn if employed
by another ﬁrm. But then we need also to allow for the entrepreneur’s opportunity cost if his
or her ﬁrm is formal, so presumably we should also subtract w from the expression for formal
proﬁt. Appropriate amendments would then be required throughout our algebra, but the general
thrust of the arguments would be unaﬀected.
8we determine how the entrepreneur’s chosen action at t =2(exit, informality or
formality), depends on the realization of θ (and also on the values of parameters
w, ¯ w, k and β). Thus we calculate the expected proﬁta tt =2 , contingent on
the action taken at t =2(the details are left to an appendix). We then consider
the choice facing the entrepreneur at t =1 . For simplicity, we do not allow
for discounting. We assume that the entrepreneur maximizes total (two-period)
expected proﬁts (which we call the ‘payoﬀ’). We denote the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt
at t =2by Eπ2(f) and Eπ2(i), respectively, depending on whether it entered
formally or informally at t =1 .
Suppose the ﬁrm was formal at t =1 .W et h e nﬁnd that if
w ≥ ¯ w/β,
that is, if the variable cost per unit of output at t =2is at least as great for
informality as for formality, informality is never chosen at t =2(regardless of how






2(βθ− ¯ w)dθ =
1
2Θβ
(2Θβ − ¯ w)
2 ,( 6 )
which is valid if
2Θ > ¯ w/β. (7)
9If, alternatively,
w<¯ w/β,( 8 )























which is valid if
2Θ > (¯ w + s)/(2β − 1).( 1 0 )
I f ,a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,t h eﬁrm was informal at t =1 ,p r o ﬁta tt =2is the same as if
the ﬁrm was formal at t =1 , except that if formality is chosen at t =2 , k must be
spent on capital. The condition that the variable cost per unit of output at t =2
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=2 Θβ − 2¯ w − k +
(k +2 s +2¯ w)
8Θ(2β − 1)2 [(3β − 2)(k +2 w)+4 ( β − 1)s],( 1 1 )
which is valid if
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[2(βθ− ¯ w) − k]dθ
=2 Θβ − 2¯ w − k +
2w2β +4 ks+2 kw +4 sw + k2 +4 s2
4Θ(2β − 1)
,( 1 4 )
which is valid if
2Θ > (¯ w + s + k)/(2β − 1). (15)
We assume that (12) and (15) hold, which implies that (7) and (10) hold.
Now let EV(f) and EV(i) denote the respective payoﬀs from entering formally
11and informally at t =1 .T h e n
EV(f)=2 ( βΘ − ¯ w − k)+Eπ2(f);( 1 6 )
EV(i)=Θ − w − k + Eπ2(i),( 1 7 )
where Eπ2(f) is given by (6) or (9) and Eπ2(i) by (11) or (14), as appropriate.
Let ∆t denote the net gain in expected proﬁta tt i m et from choosing formality
rather than informality at t =1 .T h e n
∆1 =( 2 β − 1)Θ − ¯ w − s − k;
∆2 = Eπ2(f) − Eπ2(i) ≥ 0.( 1 8 )
∆2, the net gain in expected proﬁta tt =2from choosing formality rather than
informality at t =1 , is positive because formal entry at t =1leaves the ﬁrm with
more capital at t =2than informal entry at t =1does. Provided the ﬁrm enters,
formality (informality) at t =1is preferred if
EV(f) − EV(i)=∆1 + ∆2 > (<) 0.( 1 9 )
Since ∆2 ≥ 0,as u ﬃcient condition for formality to be preferred at t =1is that
∆1 > 0.
12U s i n g( 6 ) - ( 1 5 )w eo b t a i nt h ee ﬀect of variation of parameter values on the
choice at t =1between formality and informality.
Lemma 1 EV(f)−EV(i) is increasing in Θ and β, and decreasing in w, ¯ w and
k.
Proof : see Appendix.
Higher expected output demand, as represented by Θ, favours formality be-
cause a formal ﬁrm is larger and so can take greater advantage than an informal
ﬁrm can of a greater proﬁt opportunity. The higher input costs k and w that aﬀect
a ﬁrm under either status, favour informality because informality involves smaller
size. A higher productivity parameter β only impacts on the ﬁrm if it is formal
and so favours formality. A higher minimum wage rate ¯ w,f o rc o n s t a n tw (which
is equivalent to a higher cost s of social beneﬁt provision) favours informality.
3 Informality as a Stepping Stone
We consider three ways, denoted by (S1)-(S3), in which the idea of informality as
a stepping stone might be formalized. (S1) simply interprets the stepping stone
as the possibility that the entrepreneur will enter informally and then change to
formal status. (S2) and (S3), which build on (S1), are more interesting analytically
since they distinguish the role of ﬁrst adopting informal status when this has a
13critical eﬀect on the decision to invest. (S2) introduces the additional condition
that if informality were somehow ruled out altogether, then (formal) entry at t =1
would yield a negative payoﬀ. However, as we argue below, (S2) does not fully
disentangle the stepping-stone argument from the consolation-prize one, and and
so with (S3) we introduce a modiﬁcation to (S2) that achieves this separation.
(S1) If parameter values, including the realization θ t u r no u ts u c ht h a ti n f o r -
mality is chosen at t =1 , and then formality is chosen at t =2 , then informality
has indeed been a transitional phase for the ﬁrm. This happens if both
EV(i) ≥ max[EV(f),0],( 2 0 )

















≤ w;( 2 1 )








>w ,( 2 2 )
s ot h a tf o r m a l i t yi st h e nc h o s e na tt =2 . With (S1), the prospects for the ﬁrm
appear reasonably good at t =1 , though not so good as to justify immediate
formal status; but then a good ‘draw’ of θ obtains and so a switch is made to
formality at t =2 .
(S2) The role of informality as a stepping stone is more signiﬁcant if, in addition
14to the conditions speciﬁed for (S1), parameter values are such that, if informal
entry at t =1were ruled out altogether, the ﬁrm would not enter. Thus, by
allowing experimentation at relatively low input costs, informality at t =1is the
critical factor enabling a ﬁrm to develop into formality at t =2 . Without the
stepping stone, formal status could not be achieved.
If informality at t =1is eﬀectively ruled out by law there seems no reason to
s u p p o s et h a ti tw o u l dt h e nb ep o s s i b l ea tt =2 , and so we also assume that
informality is ruled out at t =2 .F o r m a l e n t r y a t t =1would yield proﬁt
π1 =2 ( βθ − ¯ w − k) and then at t =2proﬁtw o u l db eπ2 =2 ( βθ − ¯ w) from
continued formality, or it would be zero from exit. Thus, at t =2the ﬁrm would
remain formal if θ ≥ ¯ w/β, but otherwise it would exit. Denoting by Eπ2(F) its
expected proﬁta tt =2when formality is the only productive status available, we
see that Eπ2(F)=Eπ2(f), where the latter is given by (6); i.e., expected proﬁt
at t =2is the same as when informality is possible, but parameter values result
in informality not being chosen for any realization θ. The condition that formality
in both periods would yield a negative expected proﬁt stream is therefore
EV(F)=Eπ1(F)+Eπ2(F)=2 ( βΘ − ¯ w − k)+
1
2Θβ
(2Θβ − ¯ w)
2 < 0.( 2 3 )
For the underlying integral to hold, we have already noted that (7) must be satis-
ﬁed.
15(S3) This interpretation is a development of (S2) and allows sharper diﬀer-
entiation of the stepping-stone argument from the consolation-prize one, which
relates to the role of the option of informality at t =2and its impact on behaviour
at t =1 . W i t h( S 2 )w eh a v en o tr u l e do u tt h ep o s s i b i l i t yt h a tf o r m a le n t r ya t
t =1followed by informality at t =2may yield a positive payoﬀ.T o s e p a r a t e
out this consolation-prize sequence, assume that moving in status from formality
to informality is not feasible. Then, (21)-(23) still apply, but the term EV(f)
on the right-hand side of (20) must be replaced by EV(F). However, we already
require, in (23), that EV(F) < 0, and so the term EV(F) in the amended version
of (20), becomes superﬂuous. (S3) is a less demanding interpretation than (S2),
the diﬀerence being that, instead of (20), we have simply
EV(i) ≥ 0.( 2 4 )
In considering these three interpretations we must take into account the com-
plications arising from whether (8) or (13) hold. Since, however, our concern is to
explore whether informality can have a positive role in the entry and growth of a
ﬁrm, we simplify by focusing on cases in which (8) holds (implying (13)). Thus,
labour costs per unit of output are greater under formality than informality.
To summarize, for the stepping-stone interpretation (S1) to apply, (20) and
(22) must hold so that informality is preferred at t =1 , then formality at t =2 .
16For (S2) to apply (20) and (22), plus (7) and (23) must hold so that, additionally, if
informality were ruled out, the ﬁrm would not enter. For (S3), the same conditions
as for (S2) must hold, except that (24) replaces (20), this amendment ruling out
the option of entering formally and then moving down to informal status.
One more distinction can be made. We have speciﬁed for each interpretation
that at t =2the realization θ is such that formality is then chosen; that is, the
entrepreneur actually makes the step to formality. However, we could still interpret
(S2) and (S3) as representing a stepping-stone if the step is not actually taken, that
is, if the possibility of taking the step to formality is the critical factor. Thus, (S2)
and (S3) may be interpreted as obtaining without the condition (22) necessarily
holding, but instead assuming that such a realization θ is feasible.
Proposition 1 For each of the three interpretations (S1)-(S3), there exist non-
empty sets of parameter values for which the stepping-stone argument applies.
The proposition can be proved by example. Consider (S3). We take illustrative
values of w and k, and then calculate a lower bound on s,a b o v ew h i c h( S 3 )m a y
hold. Given this value of s, the range of 2Θ for which (S3) holds is then calculated.
In Table 1, k = w =1 ,s ot h a t ,f o rt =1 , the capital costs of an informal
ﬁrm are 50% of total costs (other numerical examples give a similar ﬂavour). For
each value of β,i fw/¯ w and 2Θ a r ee a c hi nt h er a n g es h o w ni nt h er e l e v a n tr o w
of the table, (S3) holds. For example, if β =1 .5, there being a 50% productivity
17gain associated with formality, then (S3) holds if both w/¯ w ≤ 0.67 (the informal
wage being no more than about 67% of the formal wage) and 2Θ (which may
be interpreted as representing demand prospects) lies between 1.50 and 2.44. The
lower bound of the range for 2Θ is the minimum value of the realization θ at which
the entrepreneur would switch from informality to formality at t =2 .W i t h 2Θ
above this value it is feasible to take this step. The upper bound of the range
for 2Θ is the minimum value at which informality would be entirely eschewed,
formality being chosen in both periods. (Thus, for (S3) to hold, demand prospects
must be neither too favourable nor too unfavourable.)
β w/¯ w 2Θ
1.1 ≤ 0.91 1.83 − 2.66
1.3 ≤ 0.77 1.63 − 2.54
1.5 ≤ 0.67 1.50 − 2.44
1.7 ≤ 0.59 1.42 − 2.35
1.9 ≤ 0.53 1.36 − 2.27
Table 1 (S3) conditions for k = w =1
T h et a b l es h o w st h a tw h e nβ is larger, if (S3) is to hold, w/¯ w must be more
tightly constrained from above, and 2Θ must occupy a lower range. Intuitively,
when the productivity gain from formality is larger, the informal wage must un-
dercut the formal wage by more, and the demand prospects of the industry must
18be in a lower range.
Data from World Bank (2007, page 87) suggest that, on average, for the same
job, the informal wage is 56.9% of the formal wage in Argentina, and corresponding
ﬁgures are 33.0% for Bolivia, and 54.1% for the Dominican Republic. These ﬁgures
are broadly consistent with those in Table 1, suggesting that the stepping stone
may well obtain in practice. For lower values of the productivity parameter β,a
broader range of w/¯ w values is consistent with the stepping stone: for example, for
β =1 .1, w/¯ w may be up to about 91%. Even for β =1 .9, the necessary condition
is that w/¯ w ≤ 0.53, still broadly in line with the World Bank data.
F o rt h ep a r a m e t e rv a l u e sa s s u m e di nT a b l e1(w = k =1and 1.1 ≤ β ≤ 1.9)
it turns out that the conditions for (S2) are the same as those for (S3) - though
in other numerical examples (S2) involves tighter conditions. In addition to the
conditions speciﬁed in the table, for (S1) (and also for (S2) and (S3) if we include
this in our deﬁnition of these interpretations) it is required that the realization
θ actually falls within the range speciﬁed in (22), which, as already noted, is the
lower bound of the range that is speciﬁed for 2Θ.
4 Informality as a Consolation Prize
Given the parallel with the stepping-stone, we can be brief in discussing informality
as a consolation prize. Following formal entry at t =1 , (8) is a necessary condition
19for informal status to be chosen at t =2 , and so we assume it holds. We have the
following alternative interpretations.
(C1) Suppose parameter values, including the realization θ,t u r no u ts u c ht h a t
formality is chosen at t =1and then informality at t =2 . This happens if both
EV(f) ≥ max[EV(i),0],( 2 5 )
so that formality is chosen at t =1 ,a n d
w ≤ θ<(¯ w + s)/(2β − 1),( 2 6 )
so that informality is chosen at t =2 .10
(C2) The consolation prize argument is of more signiﬁcance if the ﬁrm would
not enter if informality were ruled out for the two periods, that is, if, in addition to
(25), (23) is satisﬁed, in which case (7) must hold for the integral to be valid. For
this interpretation, it is not necessary that (26) hold - we may regard the potential
compensation prize, rather than its receipt, as what matters.
(C3) However, the term EV(i) in (25) relates to informal entry at t =1followed
by either formal or informal status at t =2 .T od i ﬀerentiate the consolation prize
fully from the stepping stone we rule out the sequence of informality followed
10Here, EV(f)=2 ( βΘ − ¯ w − k)+Eπ2(f),w h e r eEπ2(f) is given by (9); EV(i)=Θ − w −
k + Eπ2(i),w h e r eEπ2(i) is given by (14). These equations also apply for (C2) and (C3).
20by formality; that is, instead of EV(f) ≥ max[EV(i),0], we now need EV(f) ≥
max[EV(i∗),0],w h e r eEV(i∗) denotes the payoﬀ from entering informally at t =1
if, for t =2 , formality is ruled out. Since this amendment involves a reduction
in the number of situations in which the consolation prize sequence is required to
yield the greater payoﬀ, a wider range of parameter values will satisfy (C3) than
(C2).
Proposition 2 For each of the three interpretations (C1)-(C3), there exist non-
empty sets of parameter values for which the consolation-prize argument applies.
For (C1) we focus on the satisfaction of (25), for if this holds (26) will also
be satisﬁed for some realizations θ.I nT a b l e2i ti sa s s u m e d ,a si nT a b l e1 ,t h a t
w = k =1 ,a n dv a l u e so fβ are speciﬁed between 1.1 and 1.9. Unlike in Table 1,
however, we ﬁnd that the required range for 2Θ, if it exists, varies with the speciﬁc
value of w/¯ w. To illustrate, if β =1 .5 then (C1) cannot hold for w/¯ w =0 .91 or
w/¯ w =0 .77;b u tf o rw/¯ w =0 .67,( C 1 )h o l d si f2Θ > 2.50, while for w/¯ w =0 .59 it
holds for 2Θ > 2.90,a n df o rw/¯ w =0 .53 it holds for 2Θ > 3.30. These ranges for
2Θ are higher than for the β =1 .5 row in Table 1 because formal entry at t =1
(as in the consolation-prize sequence) involves a higher sunk cost than informal
entry (as in the stepping-stone sequence) does.
212Θ
β w/¯ w =0 .91 w/¯ w =0 .77 w/¯ w =0 .67 w/¯ w =0 .59 w/¯ w =0 .53
1.1 > 2.83 > 3.50 > 4.17 > 4.83 > 5.83
1.3 − > 2.63 > 3.13 > 3.63 > 4.13
1.5 − − > 2.50 > 2.90 > 3.30
1.7 − − − > 2.42 > 2.75
1.9 − − − − > 2.36
Table 2 (C1) conditions for k = w =1
As w/¯ w is reduced (i.e., s is raised) in Table 2, the lower bound on the 2Θ range
increases: this happens because as w/¯ w falls 2Θ must be in a higher range to ensure
that EV(f) ≥ EV(i).A sβ is increased, formality being more proﬁtable, there is a
reduction in the lower bound on the 2Θ-range that is required for EV(f) ≥ EV(i)
to hold. But, in order for (8) to be satisﬁed, higher values of w/¯ w (lower values of
s)a r er u l e do u t .
For (C2) the picture is qualitatively diﬀerent. For example, if k = w =1there
are no values of 2Θ for which, with w/¯ w ∈ [0.5,1] and β ∈ (1,2] (C2) is satisﬁed.
There exist other ranges of parameter values that do satisfy (C2) - but these are
narrow. Suppose w =1again, but that k =2 .I f , f o r e x a m p l e , β =1 .5,t h e n
(C2) can hold for w/¯ w ∈ (0.58,0.67), but only for ranges of 2Θ for which the
upper lower bounds diﬀer from the fourth decimal place onwards. For example,
22if w/¯ w =0 .625 we require 2Θ ∈ [3.29360,3.29396]. When we search across other
ranges of parameter values, similar results are obtained. Thus, Proposition 2 is
corroborated for (C2), but it appears that there is no practical signiﬁcance.
However, (C2) is a hybrid formulation of the consolation prize argument,
whereas (C3) is a purer formulation and it involves a weaker set of conditions.
It may therefore be conjectured that (C3) will be satisﬁed for a wider range of
parameter values. Consider again, for k = w =1 ,t h ev a l u e so fw/¯ w and β used
in Table 2. For 15 of the 25 combinations of w/¯ w and β shown there, there are no
ranges of 2Θ for which (C3) obtains.11 For example, for w/¯ w =0 .67 and β =1 .1
(C3) obtains if 2Θ ∈ [3.341,3.359], while if w/¯ w is reduced to 0.53,t h er e q u i r e d
range is 2Θ ∈ [3.928,3.990];a n df o rw/¯ w =0 .53 and β =1 .5 (C3) obtains if
2Θ ∈ [2.919,2.925].12 The conjecture that (C3) will hold for a wider range of
parameter values than (C2) is correct; but the required ranges of parameter values
are still narrow compared to the ranges found for the stepping stone, and they do
not appear wide enough for the consolation prize, as represented by (C3) to play
as i g n i ﬁcant role in practice.
11The ones that do obtain are those for the four furthest right-hand cells of Table 2 for β =1 .1;
the three furthest right-hand for β =1 .3; the two furthest right-hand for β =1 .5 and the far
right-hand for β =1 .7.
12For the particular example described for (C2) above, that is, with β =1 .5 and w/¯ w =0 .625,
it is found that the required range for 2Θ is the same for (C3) as for (C2).
235 Further Comments
Our analysis has been based on a highly stylized model, but this is adequate for
establishing, by example, the possibility that the stepping-stone and consolation-
prize arguments will hold. It would be interesting to explore these arguments in
alternative models, and in particular to examine whether our negative conclusion
about the likelihood of the consolation-prize argument holding can be reversed.
Among other things, we might consider the eﬀects of better access to capital for
formal ﬁrms, greater capital intensity of formal ﬁrms, and of the existence of a
market for used capital goods. To examine these issues in detail would require a
reworking of our algebra and examples, but, to illustrate the factors that come
into consideration, here we discuss the ﬁrst of them brieﬂy.
Suppose that only formal ﬁrms can access the formal credit market and that
they therefore pay a lower unit price for their capital than informal ﬁrms do.
Thus, taking a time period in isolation, the expected proﬁtability of formality is
raised relative to that of informality, and this factor might be decisive in causing
an entrepreneur to choose formality rather than informality. However, we cannot
j u m pt ot h es a m ec o n c l u s i o ni nad y n a m i cc o n t e x t .W ef o c u so nt h es t e p p i n gs t o n e
here, but a similar conjecture applies for the consolation prize.13 The critical point
13Another possibility is that an informal ﬁrm faces a binding constraint on its availability of
credit, whereas a formal ﬁrm is unconstrained. This would work against both the stepping-stone
and consolation-prize arguments.
24is that an increase in the expected proﬁtability of formality at t =2not only raises
the payoﬀ14 from entering formally at t =1 , but also raises the payoﬀ from entering
informally at t =1because the ﬁrm then has the option of formal status at t =2 .
Assume ﬁr s tt h a tt h e r ei sas i n g l ep r i c ef o rc a p i t a l .S u p p o s et h a t( i )i fi n f o r m a l -
ity were ruled out the entrepreneur would not enter, i.e., the payoﬀ from entering
formally and then either remaining formal or exiting, as appropriate, would be
negative; and (ii) if informality were possible, informality at t =1 , followed by
whatever behaviour turns out to maximize proﬁta tt =2 , also yields a negative
payoﬀ, though suppose this payoﬀ is close to zero. Now amend the model such
that the price of capital for an informal ﬁrm, but not that for an informal one,
is reduced. This raises the payoﬀs for both scenarios, (i) and (ii); but even if it
raises the payoﬀ for (i) by much more than that for (ii), we conjecture that the
payoﬀ for (i) may still be negative, while that for (ii) may become positive. If,
at t =2 , the realization of θ turns out to be high, formality will then be chosen.
Thus, we suggest that a lower price for formal capital may, for some parameter
ranges, widen the applicability of the stepping-stone argument. Further analysis
is required to test this conjecture.
14Recall that, for brevity, we are using the term ‘payoﬀ’ to represent the present value, as of
the beginning of t =1 , of the expected proﬁt stream over the two periods in the model.
256 Concluding Comments
Analysis of the role of informal ﬁrms in developing economies has not previously
focused on the dynamic role of informality. In this paper it is shown that infor-
mality may be a stepping stone toward formality for a ﬁrm and that without the
stepping stone formality might never be achieved. Although the analysis is based
on a simple stylized model, it appears that the stepping stone may be inducement
to entry and growth for a broad range of realistic parameter values.
It has also been established that informality may be a consolation prize for a
ﬁrm, and, in particular, that the existence of the potential fallback of informality,
should proﬁtability turn out to be disappointing, can be the decisive factor induc-
ing a ﬁrm to enter. However, this result only obtains for a very narrow range of
parameter values, and so does not appear to be of practical signiﬁcance, though
we cannot rule out the possibility that the consolation prize would play a greater
role in a less stylized model.
The greater signiﬁcance of the stepping stone, compared to the consolation
prize, may not be found surprising when we consider the diﬀerence in sunk costs be-
tween the two. Each involves entry under uncertainty, but with the stepping stone
a small amount of capital is sunk before further commitment is made, whereas with
the consolation prize a larger amount of capital is sunk initially. Thus, it is harder
to ﬁnd parameter values that make entry justiﬁable in terms of the consolation-
26prize argument. We conclude that on stepping-stone (but not consolation-prize)
grounds there can be a dynamic case for government being lenient in its policy
towards the informal sector.
Appendix
Derivation of Expected Proﬁta tt =2
We write X to denote exit, I informal status, F formal status and SO staying
out of the industry. Consider behaviour at t =2 .I f F a t t =1 , from (3) and
(5) proﬁts at t =2are θ − w if I is chosen, but 2(βθ − ¯ w) if F chosen. Thus,
if w ≥ ¯ w/β, I is not chosen at t =2for any θ: X is chosen if θ<¯ w/β,b u tF
if θ ≥ ¯ w/β. (6) follows. But if (8) holds, at t =2X is chosen if θ<w ;Ii f
w ≤ θ<(¯ w + s)/(2β − 1);Fi f(¯ w + s)/(2β − 1) ≤ θ ≤ 2Θ. (9) follows.
If I at t =1 ,t h e ni f 1
β
¡
¯ w + k
2
¢
≤ w,a tt =2X (F) is chosen if θ<(≥
)(¯ w + k
2)/β. (11) follows. But if (13) holds, at t =2Xi sc h o s e ni fθ<w ;Ii f
w ≤ θ<(¯ w + s + k)/(2β − 1);Fi f(¯ w + s + k)/(2β − 1) ≤ θ.( 1 4 )f o l l o w s .
Lemma 1
From (19), EV(f) − EV(i)=∆1 + ∆2.F r o m( 1 8 ) ,∆1 is increasing in Θ,a n d
β, and decreasing in s, k and w, as in the lemma. We now focus on ∆2.S i n c e( 8 )
and (13) each may or may not hold, and k>0, three cases can be distinguished.
27First, if
¡
¯ w + k
2
¢
≤ w then, using (6) and (11),








(k +4 s +2 w)
4(2β − 1)2 [(3β − 2)(k +2 w)+4 ( β − 1)s]
¾
.
Using (12), the lemma follows for this case. Second, if 1
β ¯ w ≤ w<1
β
¡




using (6) and (14),
















Using (15), the lemma follows for this case. Third, if w<1
β ¯ w, then using (9) and
(14),
∆2 = k −
1
4(2β − 1)Θ
[2(¯ w + s)+k]k.
Using (10) and (15), the lemma follows for this case.
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